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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of income levels, using the World Bank income classification, 
and political development, using EIU Democracy Index scores, in determining the magnitude 
of FDI growth effects for a panel of 61 emerging and developing countries for the period 
1989 to 2013. It tests a baseline growth model incorporating these variables which is then 
extended to include FDI interaction effects with human capital, measured using secondary 
school enrolment data, and political development. The separate growth effects of FDI are 
then tested separately for each of the three lower World Bank income classifications (Upper-
Middle, Lower-Middle and Low Income) followed by three categories of political regime 
type derived from Democracy Index. The effects of FDI are found to vary significantly 
between income classifications with the strongest growth effects in Low Income countries 
and weaker negative effects in Upper-Middle Income countries. The growth interaction 
effects between FDI and human capital are found to be strongly positive regardless of regime 
type. Political development in conjunction with FDI appears to suppress the growth effects of 
FDI in authoritarian countries while enhancing them in ‘hybrid’ democracies. For more 
democratic countries, human capital is a more important driver of growth than FDI but this is 
the outcome of strongly positive interaction effects between FDI and human capital 
outweighing negative effects for human capital on its own. The paper also provides some 
support for the view that a critical threshold of human capital is required to generate 
beneficial spillover growth effects from inflows of FDI. This paper provides new and more 
detailed insights into the growth effects of FDI with particular respect to income 
classification and political regime type in emerging and developing countries. 
JEL Classifications: F23, O11, O14, O47 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; economic growth; developing countries; income level; 
political development; panel analysis. 
Economic, Institutional & Political Determinants of FDI Growth Effects in 
Emerging & Developing Countries 
FDI plays a well-known and significant role in the economic growth trajectory of countries 
although rather less is understood about the specific mechanisms through which FDI 
contributes to their economic development. The most fundamental contribution of FDI is to 
increase a country’s stock of physical capital but, according to new growth theory, its indirect 
effects arising from technology spillovers and efficiency gains are critically important. 
Empirical studies of FDI however, find that the magnitude of these indirect growth effects on 
host-economies is determined by the levels of domestic economic and institutional 
development as well as the quality of their policy-making. The general consensus is therefore 
that certain pre-conditions need to be satisfied for FDI inflows to generate positive host-
economy growth effects; namely the stock of skilled labour or human capital and the political 
system and quality of governance which, in turn, determine the extent to which the benefits 
of FDI are distributed to the wider population. A well-educated and skilled labour force is 
seen to attract inflows of investment by relatively technology-intensive foreign firms in high 
growth sectors as well as being the mechanism through which technology can be assimilated 
and transferred to domestic firms. More democratic political systems are argued to be more 
likely to redistribute income gains from FDI inflows, so increasing investment in education 
and the domestic stock of human capital. Further, they are more likely to have liberal open 
economies that are integrated into global trade and production networks and attract 
internationally-competitive export-oriented FDI. Conversely, developing countries with 
authoritarian regimes tend to have poorly-developed political institutions and protected 
markets characterised by a lack of competition, attracting less technology-intensive more 
market-oriented FDI that generate fewer potential spillover gains. 
This study investigates the impact of level of development and the quality of political 
institutions on the gains from inflows of FDI to 61 host emerging and developing economies. 
In so doing, it contributes to improving the understanding of the dynamic relationship 
between FDI and economic growth in such countries by investigating the role of the domestic 
human capital stock in generating positive output effects of FDI. The empirical analysis uses 
a panel data set of 61 emerging and developing countries for the period 1989-2013, so 
avoiding the cross-sectional issues arising in many previous studies. 
This paper is organised as follows. The first section presents an overview of the relevant 
empirical literature investigating the impact of economic and political development on the 
growth effects FDI. This is followed by an outline of the empirical model and the estimation 
method used in the study. Section 3 provides a brief summary description of the dataset. 
Section four presents the estimation method, results and analysis. The final section presents 
some concluding remarks and policy implications.  
1. Host-Country Economic Growth Effects of FDI
A plethora of empirical studies examine the impact of FDI on growth in emerging and 
developing host economies. A key finding in the context of the objectives of this paper is that 
the extent of positive output effects and technology spillovers are dependent upon the host 
country stock of human capital. A further explanation of the lack of significant spillover 
effects however, lies in the sectoral distribution of FDI inflows in developing host countries, 
given the importance of primary resource extractive activities that generate limited spillovers 
and limited and transferable technology. An additional refinement is the analysis of the inter-
relationship between political regime, inflows of FDI and the growth effects of FDI. 
Several studies find that FDI inflows generate no significant positive spillover effects arising 
from the domestic human capital stock (e.g., Nair-Reichert & Weinhold, 2001; Ram & 
Zhang, 2002) while many others find evidence of a non-linear relationship. Some of the 
differences in these findings may be attributable to alternative specifications of human 
capital; educational enrolment versus returns to schooling, skilfulness and the quality of 
education (Pritchett, 2001). The general consensus however, is that the growth effects of FDI 
are dependent upon the absorptive capacity of a minimum threshold stock of domestic human 
capital (see, for example, De Gregorio, 1992; Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Mody & Wang, 
1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Balasubramanyam et al., 1999; Li & Liu, 2005; Bodman & 
Le, 2013). This stock of human capital is, in turn, partly determined by host-country income 
and the level of political, institutional and infrastructural development and the extent of 
market liberalisation (Abramovitz, 1986). Beneficial technology transfer and knowledge 
spillovers are therefore not a ‘natural’ phenomenon arising simply as a result of inflows of 
FDI but rather likely to be the outcome of appropriate economic policies and supportive 
institutional development  
Blomstrom et al. (1992), de Soysa & Oneal (1999) and Chamarbagwala et al. all (2000) 
demonstrate that the growth effects of FDI inflows are positively related to the domestic 
stock of human capital. de Sosya & Oneal also find that FDI inflows – but not the stock of 
FDI – promote growth in conjunction with domestic human capital and are more productive 
than domestic capital. Nair-Reichert & Weinhold (2001) examine for causality between FDI 
inflows and economic growth using a sample of 24 developing countries and find a positive 
relationship from FDI to growth. Similarly, Makki & Somwaru (2004) examine the impact of 
FDI on economic growth in 66 developing countries and identify FDI as an important 
stimulus of both domestic investment and growth. Durham (2004) finds that positive growth 
effects of FDI depend upon both the absorptive capacity of the human capital stock but also 
the level of financial development. These findings are supported by those of Batten & Vo 
(2009) who also find that openness to trade is also a significant determinant.  
This latter point picks up on Bhagwati’s arguments regarding the volume of FDI inflows and 
their growth spillover effects being dependent upon countries’ openness to trade; i.e., 
outward trade orientation (Bhagwati, 1978). Studies by Balasubramanyam & Salisu (1991), 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Zhang (2001) and Whalley & Xin (2010) all find evidence 
that participation in international trade develops export capabilities, technological 
competencies and the competitiveness of domestic firms. These capabilities strengthen the 
impact of FDI on technology utilisation and labour productivity in host-countries. A panel 
data analysis by Borensztein et al. (1998) however, finds no significant interaction effects 
between FDI and trade regime for 69 developing countries while De Mello (1999) suggests 
that relatively closed trade regimes hinder the growth effects of FDI and technology transfer 
in lagging developing countries. 
The impact of FDI inflows on growth in developing countries is generally posited to be 
dependent upon pre-existing or threshold levels of host-country income, political 
development and institutional quality. There are however, conflicting views as to how 
democratic institutions affect inflows of FDI. Olson (1993) argues that countries with 
democratic institutions have a greater chance of attracting foreign firms because they are 
more likely to protect property rights, have independent judiciaries and more effective 
systems to resolve business disputes. Democracy certainly provides an effective conduit 
between citizens and policy-makers. Other studies contend that countries with less well 
developed democratic institutions are more attractive because they are better able to offer 
preferential treatment in the form of tax concessions and other incentives, compliant labour 
forces and less stringent policies towards competition, leading to higher rates of return (e.g., 
O’Donnell, 1978; Haggard, 1990; Oneal, 1994; Lee & Resnick, 2003). Several studies also 
highlight the critical importance of host-country financial development and regulation (e.g., 
Quinn, 2000; Hermes & Lensink, 2003; Li & Resnick, 2003; Ang, 2009; Alfaro et al., 2009). 
One of the earliest studies to consider the relationship between political institutions in 
emerging and developing countries and FDI inflows is that of Bornschier (1978) who finds 
that more authoritarian regimes attract greater inflows of FDI inflows but that the growth 
effects are mixed at best. Borensztein et al. (1998) control for the number of assassinations, 
coups d’état, protection of political rights and wars but find that they have little significant 
effect on FDI inflows. The authors argue that this result can be explained by the almost 
complete lack of political quality in many developing countries. Li & Resnick (2003) find 
that the protection of property rights has a positive effect on FDI inflows but that developing 
countries with democratic political systems receive significantly lower FDI inflows. Choi & 
Samy (2008) find only a weak relationship between democracy and inflows of FDI. Most 
studies however, generally find some form of positive relationship between the two; Harms & 
Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2203), Busse (2004), Jakobsen & de Soysa (2006) and Busse & 
Hefeker (2007) all show that more politically developed countries with democratic 
institutions receive significantly higher inflows of FDI. Interestingly, Busse (2004) finds that 
this relationship prevailed during the 1990s and not the 1970s and 1980s. The positive 
relationship between democracy and FDI inflows therefore is by no means assured. 
A separate strand of the literature looks at governance and FDI inflows in natural resources. 
Jensen (2006) finds that democratic countries attract greater inflows of resource-seeking FDI 
into abundant natural resources after controlling for selection bias of authoritarian developing 
countries. Asiedu & Lien (2011) also find that democratisation has a positive and significant 
effect on FDI in developing countries given a certain share of natural resource and minerals 
in total exports. These studies therefore suggest that inflows of resource-based FDI in 
developing countries tend to be positively affected by the evolution of political systems and 
democratic institutions.  
Only a limited number of studies however, focus on the effect of host-country democratic 
institutions on the efficiency gains and spillovers generated by inflows of FDI. Bengoa & 
Sanchez-Robles (2003) use panel data for 18 Latin American economies to analyse the 
relationship between FDI inflows, ‘economic freedom’ – including the domestic economic 
policy environment – and growth. Their findings indicate a positive correlation between FDI 
inflows and both economic freedom and growth, conditional upon a threshold stock of human 
capital. Darrat et al. (2005) compare the growth effects of FDI inflows between EU accession 
and non-applicant economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) alongside economies in 
the Middle East and North African (MENA). They find that FDI inflows are positively 
correlated with growth for EU accession CEE economies but there is only a weak relationship 
with respect to the other countries. The authors argue that these findings reflect differences in 
the institutional and policy-making environments between these sets of countries, with the 
accession economies benefiting from implicit or explicit EU guarantees of democracy and 
macroeconomic stability. 
This paper attempts to extend the analysis of the relationship between FDI inflows, economic 
development and institutional quality. It investigates the impact of FDI inflows on growth for 
a large sample set of 61 emerging and developing countries using panel data for a period of 
twenty-five years, 1989 to 2013, with measures of human capital, indicators of 
macroeconomic stability (domestic investment, government expenditure and inflation) and 
political development (The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index). 
 
2. Estimation Framework  
The analysis employs an augmented growth accounting model incorporating FDI based upon 
Solow (1956) and in line with the work of De Mello (1997) and Borensztein et al. (1998). 
Y = A f(Kit, Lit, Fit, Ωit) (Eqn. 1) 
Where: Y is the output level, determined by capital, K, labour, L, FDI inflows, F, and political 
development and other growth determinants included in Ω , while A represents the economic 
environment.  
According to new growth theory, FDI is considered to be an additional source of capital 
injections into a host-economy with special characteristics. Foreign capital inflows in this 
form embody technology, know-how and tacit knowledge, all of which promote host-country 
technological and human capital development, and are the primary transmission mechanism 
for transferring these potentially growth-enhancing assets. While there is little doubt in the 
literature regarding the contribution of FDI inflows to augmenting domestic capital stock in 
host-countries, there exists no clear consensus regarding its indirect growth effects in the 
form of technology spillovers and efficiency gains. This study tests the hypothesis that FDI 
triggers significant growth effects while controlling for other contingent domestic growth 
determinants. The empirical specification of the model follows Blomstrom et al. (1992), 
Borensztein et al. (1998) and Balasubramanyam et al. (1999): 
GYit = α0 + α1LogYt-1 + α2GLABit + α3DIit + α4HCit + α5GEit + α6INFit + α7FDIit-1 + 
α8FDIit_HCit + α9Polit + α10FDIit_Polit + νi + εt + µit (Eqn. 2) 
Where: the dependent variable GY is the growth rate of real GDP per capita; LogYit-1 is GDP 
per capita lagged by one time period; GLAB is the growth rate of the labour force; DI is the 
share of domestic capital accumulation measured by the rate of gross fixed capital formation 
to GDP; HC is human capital, measured by a five-year average of the secondary school 
enrolment ratio, following Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995b); GE is the share of government in 
total consumption; INF is the inflation rate, measured using the GDP deflator; FDI is the 
inflow of FDI measured as a share of GDP; the interaction term FDI_HC shows the joint 
effect of FDI and human capital stock on economic growth; vi captures country-specific 
effects that reflect heterogeneity in growth patterns across countries; uit is the unexplained 
error term; et are time-specific elements which control for technological changes and policy 
direction across time; and i, t are the country and time indicators.  
The inclusion of the lagged GDP per capita term LogYit-1 in the model follows Islam (1995) 
so as to capture the effect of neoclassical catch up whereby developing countries exhibit 
higher growth rates owing to their capital relative scarcity that generates a higher marginal 
productivity than in more advanced countries. Panel-data studies that control for country-
specific effects, unlike cross-sectional studies, cannot include time invariant variables such as 
the logarithm of initial output on the right-hand side so a lagged output term is used instead. 
The coefficient of lagged output is expected to have a negative sign, indicating that countries 
with higher GDP in the preceding period tend to have lower economic growth in the current 
and subsequent periods.  
The growth of the labour force GLAB is incorporated into the growth accounting analysis as a 
basic production input. Given that all other factors of production are constant, the growth of 
the labour force will eventually result in diminishing marginal returns, so threatening the 
sustainability of economic growth in the long-run. This term is regarded as a key determinant 
in the empirical analysis of the FDI-growth nexus (e.g., Blomstrom et al., 1992; 
Balasubramanyam et al., 1999; Darrat et al., 2005). This study follows Blomstrom et al. 
(1992) in employing the growth rate of the labour force participation rate, the ratio of the 
labour force to the total population, so as to capture the critical impact of demographic 
change in developing countries.  
Physical capital accumulation is considered to be the main driver of economic growth from a 
growth accounting perspective. Domestic investment DI represents domestic capital 
accumulation and is measured by the share of gross fixed capital formation to GDP. 
Including both domestic and foreign investment in the growth accounting function captures 
the indirect growth effects of FDI that are not reflected simply in physical capital 
accumulation. These indirect effects include technology transfer and efficiency gains 
accruing to the host-economies.  
Nelson & Phelps (1966) argue that sustainable long-run economic growth is determined by 
the stock of well-educated labour that is able to understand advanced technologies and 
introduce productive innovations – absorptive capacity. New growth theory highlights the 
important contribution of human capital accumulation to sustainable output growth such that 
investment in human capital is a critical component of long-run economic growth. Lucas 
(1988) shows that growth differentials between countries are mainly explained by differences 
in the stock of domestic human capital. The growth and productivity effects arising from 
capital deepening, i.e., increasing capital per worker, are primarily dependent upon a 
country’s stock of human capital. Quantifying human capital however, is more problematic 
because it is intrinsic in nature. This paper follows the convention established by Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin (1995a) and employs a school attainment variable as a proxy for the human 
capital stock measured by the five-year average of the secondary school enrolment ratio 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995b). Many empirical studies report a negative coefficient estimate 
for human capital on economic growth (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Islam, 1995). Pritchett 
(2001) criticises the use of school attainment as a proxy for human capital, especially for 
developing countries where growing school enrolments may be associated with low quality 
education such that greater educational enrolment is not necessarily reflected in more 
productive skills. Temple (1999) argues that educational attainment and its effects on the 
human capital stock differ between countries according to their characteristics. 
Government expenditure GE and inflation INF are included in the empirical analysis here to 
capture the macroeconomic policy dimensions of institutional quality. Owing to the 
limitations on the availability of detailed macroeconomic data when dealing with emerging 
and developing countries, this paper follows the convention of simply using total government 
expenditure as a proxy for the quality of fiscal policy rather than deducting defence and 
education expenditure as done by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995a). GE here is measured by the 
share of government expenditure in consumption and provides an indicator of the size of 
government, bureaucracy and political corruption, all of which are viewed as impediments to 
growth. Barro (1997) also argues that a system of progressive taxation discourages both 
domestic and foreign investment. The expectation is that higher government expenditure is 
associated negatively with growth effects (Borensztein et al., 1998; Carkovic & Levine, 
2002). The inflation rate (INF), measured by the GDP deflator, indicates the effects of 
monetary policies on economic growth. Low rates of inflation reflect the stability and 
credibility of monetary policies required to support growth while higher rates are associated 
with increasing costs of production and a more volatile investment climate, both of which 
dampen real growth. 
The foreign direct investment variable FDI, measured as a share of GDP, shows the direct 
growth effects of FDI inflows. The variable is lagged by one period in order to avoid 
problems of endogeneity. The simultaneous inclusion of domestic investment DI 
demonstrates the independent effect of FDI inflows on the growth rate through improvements 
in the productivity of capital by controlling for domestic investment (Lee, 1995; Durham, 
2004). Including both components of investment also provides the means to also capture the 
indirect spillover effects of FDI over and above the effects of purely physical capital 
accumulation (Borensztein et al., 1998).  
The political development variable Pol measures the quality of domestic governance and 
institutions using the country score provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index. This provides an indication of the relationship between per capita income 
growth and a country’s type of political regime. 
The interaction variable FDIt_HC shows the joint effect of FDI and human capital stock on 
economic growth. This picks up on the arguments outlined in the literature review regarding 
the growth effects of FDI being contingent upon the stock of human capital in host-
economies (Barro, 1997; Mody & Wang, 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Balasubramanyam 
et al., 1999). Statistical significance of this variable implies that FDI prompts positive growth 
effects based upon a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Moreover, once this 
threshold is reached, it induces a paradigm shift in the motives for FDI, from resource- or 
market-seeking to efficiency-seeking FDI (Bende-Nabende & Ford, 1998).  
The interaction variable FDI_Pol reveals the joint effect of FDI and political development 
and is intended to indicate the extent to which the indirect effects of FDI inflows in the form 
of technology spillovers and efficiency gains differ based upon the political regime. This 
provides a means to assess the magnitude of the growth effects of FDI on emerging and 
developing countries in different stages of political development.  
The country-specific effects vi reflect the heterogeneity in growth patterns between countries 
and eliminates the potential for correlation between the determinants of growth and the 
unexplained error term uit. The time-specific elements et control for technological changes 
and policy direction across time and eliminates the potential for serial correlation in the 
random error terms (Eller et al., 2006; Vu et al., 2008). This also deals with some sources of 
endogeneity problems that may result if the error terms explain the growth of output. uit are 
the random shocks that are assumed to be idiosyncratically and identically distributed with 
zero mean and variance σ2.  
 
3. Data: Sources & Definitions 
The empirical analysis employs a stratified panel of 61 emerging and developing host-
countries for 1989-2013, selected to provide a reasonably representative sample of all 
emerging and developing countries across World Bank-defined global regions, World Bank 
income classifications (Low, Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle Income) and political 
development, subject to data availability. A full list of these 61 countries is presented in 
Table 1 by region, initial and final income classification and political regime classification. 
[Table 1 here] 
The primary data source for annual data for GDP growth, labour force growth, domestic 
investment, human capital, government expenditure, inflation and foreign direct investment is 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (data.worldbank.org), accessed 
during 2014 and 2015. All variables of interest are expressed in constant $US prices for 2000 
with the exception of: income per capita, gross national income (GNI) per capita at current 
$US purchasing power parity, based upon the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) 
round; and foreign direct investment, which is only available in current $US prices. The real 
values of FDI inflows are computed using the respective GDP deflators using 2000 as the 
base year. 
 
Income Level Classification 
The 61 emerging and developing countries included in the data set are disaggregated in Table 
1 into the three lower World Bank income categories according to their initial per capita 
income classification in 1989. The table also indicates the end period income classification in 
2013.  
It is evident that only nine countries have moved between categories, most notably China 
from Low Income to Upper-Middle Income, including Kenya and Madagascar which have 
moved from the Lower-Middle income to the Low Income category and Moldova and 
Ukraine from Upper-Middle to Lower-Middle Income. The exceptional growth performance 
of China needs no further discussion here. It should be noted however, that the apparent 
‘deterioration’ of per capita incomes in Kenya, Madagascar, Moldova and Ukraine is 
primarily a relative rather than absolute phenomenon. The World Bank’s classification is 
dynamic and revised upwards on an annual basis – developing countries therefore have 
grown less poor generally – but the distribution of countries at the margin between categories 
does change. 
The paper follows Blomstrom et al. (1992), Alguacil et al. (2011) and Bruno & Campos 
(2011) in classifying the host-countries in the data set according to their initial World Bank 
income category. This permits the testing of the extent of heterogeneity in the interplay 
between FDI inflows and growth since these inflows are argued to be a significant driver of 
economic growth in those host-countries that possess a minimum threshold stock of human 
capital, as demonstrated by Bruno & Campos (2011). This investigative approach is of 
particular relevance with respect to the analysis of the growth effects of FDI inflows to 
emerging and developing countries and those in transition – hence the focus of this paper – 
since it examines the conditions necessary to generate positive FDI spillovers. 
 
Political Development 
The data on political systems is drawn from the annual Democracy Index scores produced by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit. The index scores 167 countries on the basis of five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013). These are 
aggregated into an overall score for each country lying in the range from 1.0 to 10.0. 
Countries scoring between 1.0 and 3.99 are classified as Authoritarian, those between 4.0 and 
5.99 as ‘Hybrid’ regimes, those between 6.0 and 7.99 as ‘Flawed’ democracies and those 
between 8.0 and 10.0 as ‘Full’ democracies. Flawed democracies are characterised by a 
degree of political development comprising free and fair elections and protection of civil 
liberties but weakness in other aspects such as low levels of political participation and 
problems in governance. Hybrid democracies have multiple political parties and elections but 
are characterised by weak civil society, corruption and lack of rule of law. Authoritarian 
regimes indicate the absence of political pluralism, elections are neither free nor fair and 
infringements of civil rights are common. Some conditional thresholds are applied to avoid 
anomalies caused by the aggregation of relatively high scores in one or more categories 
conflicting with the overall regime classification.  
The Democracy Index was first produced in 2006 and published on a biannual basis until 
2010, since when it has been appeared annually. As such, no continuous time-series political 
data for the whole of the study period 1989 to 2013 is available for any of the countries 
included in the sample data set. Instead, average overall scores for the four-year period 2010 
to 2013 are used, while recognising that these do not provide full information, particularly 
where one or more regime changes have taken place since 1989. The classification of the 61 
countries according to their political regime classification is also presented in Table 1. There 
are two other principal sources of data on political development, produced by Freedom House 
and the World Bank. Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World publication scores some 
194 countries and territories according to political liberties and civil rights using simple 
scales of integers from one to seven. The World Bank’s Governance Indicators provide 
scores for six facets of governance and political development (voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, control of corruption) for up to 196 countries and territories. Apart from the lack of 
sophistication of the Freedom House scoring method, there is very little to choose between 
the alternative indices in that they all produce broadly similar evaluations. Further, all of the 
countries in the study feature in all three indices. The Democracy Index is preferred as the 
appropriate source for political development scores in this study primarily because the World 
Bank does not aggregate its governance scores to produce an overall index.  
Only Costa Rica and Mauritius of the 61 emerging and developing countries included in the 
dataset are classified as Full democracies by the Democracy Index (see Table 1). For the 
purposes of this paper, the empirical analysis of the impact of host-country political regime 
on inflows of FDI therefore combines the Full and Flawed democracy categories so as to 
provide greater balance across the regimes of the sample countries. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive summary statistics for the nine independent variables used in this study 
across the complete time period 1989-2013 are presented in Table 2. This provides details of 
the numbers of observations for each variable, their means and standard deviations along with 
their minimum and maximum values.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
4. Estimation Method, Results & Analysis 
The empirical analysis in this paper examines the growth effects of FDI in a panel of 61 
emerging and developing countries from 1989 to 2013. The use of a panel-data approach 
permits the consideration of within country growth patterns while also allowing for variation 
across countries (Islam, 1995; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003). Variations in growth 
patterns across countries are reflected in the heterogeneous country-specific elements 
included in the vi term in the model described in Equation 2. The country-specific effects 
explain unobserved variations within each country in the dataset that are invariant over time. 
The model also includes time-specific factors (et) to control for business cycle changes and 
eliminates the probability of correlation between growth determinants resulting from 
contemporaneous time-specific exogenous shocks (Eller et al., 2006; Vu et al., 2008). 
The analysis is based upon panel corrected standard errors that control for the 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors and heteroskedasticity across countries (Beck & 
Katz, 1995). The structure of the data makes the stationarity of the variables over time critical 
for the estimation process. Stationarity implies that the probability distribution of the 
variables does not change over time. The Im, Pesaran & Shin Test cannot accept the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity for most variables at conventional significance levels (Im et 
al., 2003). The logarithm of one-year lagged GDP per capita however, has a unit root. This 
catch-up condition is nevertheless a highly relevant variable that needs to be incorporated in 
the growth accounting function of the emerging and developing country dataset and it is 
therefore retained in this application. 
The mutually bi-directional relationship between FDI and economic growth has been the 
subject of extensive research in previous empirical studies (for example: Tsai, 1994; Barro, 
1997; Basu et al., 2003; Choe, 2003; Chowdhury & Mavrotas, 2006). This endogeneity 
problem leads to biased and inconsistent OLS estimates since the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the error term. Moreover, the growth determinants may be mutually affected 
by the economic growth rate. A positive productivity shock or an adverse exogenous shock 
would therefore affect the growth determinants, FDI and economic growth simultaneously. 
The FDI inflow variable is therefore lagged by one period in order to avoid this endogeneity 
problem. 
 
Results for Models 1 & 2: Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries 
The empirical results of the panel data analysis based upon Equation 2 for the 61 emerging 
and developing countries in the dataset are reported in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 present the 
baseline results for the full dataset of emerging and developing countries with respect to the 
determinants of economic growth, including FDI in columns 1 and 2 of the table respectively. 
Model 1 is a straightforward augmented model testing the principal determinants of economic 
growth. Model 2 additionally includes the two interaction terms: between FDI and human 
capital (FDI_HC); and FDI and political development (FDI_Pol). 
[Table 3 here] 
The results for Model 1, shown in column 1 of Table 3, generally conform to a priori 
expectations. As is common in the empirical growth literature, the coefficient of the lagged 
GDP per capita term GYt-1 is found to be negative and significant at the one per cent level, 
reflecting convergence. Likewise, domestic investment DI has a positive coefficient – i.e., it 
promotes growth – and is also found to be significant at the one per cent level. Government 
expenditure GE is also significant at the one per cent level but, in this case, it has a negative 
coefficient such that it is associated with lower growth. This is in accord with the proposition 
of Barro (1997) and, given that many of these are developing countries where domestic 
sources of capital are likely to be limited, it could also provide an indication of private sector 
investment being ‘crowded-out’ by higher levels of government spending. Inflation INF has a 
very small negative coefficient and is significant at the 1 per cent level. This is in accord with 
a priori expectations regarding the likelihood that expansionary fiscal policies retard growth. 
Both the quantity of labour (labour force growth GLAB) and its quality (HC) are found to 
have a weakly significant effect on economic growth at the 10 per cent level. Since both 
coefficients are negative, this suggests that these two factors tend to depress growth, 
something that is contrary to a priori expectations but is a common finding in studies of this 
type. Lagged FDI also exerts a weakly significant negative effect on growth at the ten per 
cent level in this initial specification of the model. The results for the political development 
variable Pol however, are of particular interest in that the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the one per cent level such that higher political development scores are 
associated with stronger economic growth performance. 
Model 2 (column 2, Table 3) is an augmented version of Model 1 incorporating the two FDI 
interaction terms. The overall results of the model exhibit a remarkably similar degree of 
robustness to those of Model 1 with virtually no major changes in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients or their significances. The only change of note is that the FDI variable changes 
sign to become positive but is now insignificant. Neither of the two FDI interaction terms is 
found to be significant. 
 
Results for Models 3, 4 & 5: Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing 
Countries By Income  
The sample dataset of 61 emerging and developing countries is split into three separate 
groups on the basis of their initial World Bank income category in 1989 and the results for 
Models 3, 4 and 5 are presented in columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 3. These models use the same 
specification as that used in Model 2 but the estimation procedure is rerun separately for each 
income category; Upper-Middle, Lower-Middle and Low Income. The results remain 
reasonable robust to a degree after splitting the sample data set according to income and they 
reveal some interesting findings in spite of some imbalance in the distribution of the sample 
countries between categories. 
Taking the results for the 28 Upper-Middle Income countries first, it can be seen from 
column 3 in Table 3 that the results are broadly in line with those for the full dataset in 
Models 1 and 2. The only changes to note are that both the labour force and human capital 
terms cease to be significant, albeit previously weakly. Of greater interest perhaps is that, as 
is nearly always the case in Models 1 and 2, none of the three variables derived from FDI 
achieve statistical significance. Finally, it is very evident that political development score Pol 
continues to exerts a positive and significant influence on growth. Given that Pol is 
insignificant for the two lower income categories (columns 4 and 5), it would appear that the 
Upper-Middle income group is also driving this finding in both Models 1 and 2. One 
explanation for this result could be the uneven distribution of FDI across sectors in countries 
with different levels of income; that is, that FDI in more advanced developing and emerging 
economies can be expected to be increasingly engaged in market- and efficiency-seeking 
manufacturing and service activities based upon a greater stock of human capital rather than 
natural resources, as proposed by Bende-Nabende & Ford (1998). 
The picture is very different however, for the 22 Lower-Middle Income developing countries 
in the dataset. The parameter estimates for the FDI variable is found to be both negative and 
significant at the 5 per cent level but the FDI interaction term with political development is 
positive and significant at the one per cent level. This finding demonstrates that FDI in 
conjunction with a higher political development score acts as a driver of economic growth, 
subject to the presence of the right democratic ‘pre-conditions’ in the host-country. In other 
words, the implication is that simply attracting FDI is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for generate growth. 
The results for the 11 Low Income least-developed countries strongly uphold the importance 
of FDI in the growth process given that it is found to have a positive coefficient and 
significant at the one per cent level. This important positive growth effect however, is 
moderated by the negative interaction effects between FDI and political development which 
is significant at the one per cent level. This suggests that the growth stimulus provided by 
inflows of FDI in these low income countries is negatively related to the existence of more 
democratic political regimes. Given that FDI in low income economies tends to be more 
strongly oriented towards natural resource extraction, these results contrasts with those of 
both Jensen (2006) and Asiedu & Lien (2011) who find a positive relationship between 
democracy and FDI. The findings in this paper for the low income countries appear to fit 
more easily with some of the literature dealing with the inter-relationships between natural 
resources, growth, inequality and authoritarianism (for example, Dunning, 2008; Haber & 
Menaldo, 2011; Acemoglou & Robinson, 2012). 
 
Results for Model 6, 7 & 8: Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries 
By Political Regime  
The estimation procedure for the third set of models uses the same specification as for Model 
2 except that, in this case, the sample data set of 61 emerging and developing countries is 
split according to political regime type and rerun separately for each. Note that regime type is 
determined by the Democracy Index score thresholds defined by the EIU, outlined in Section 
3. Only two of the countries in the sample however, are classified as ‘Full’ democracies 
(Costa Rica and Mauritius). For the purposes of the analyses here, they are combined with the 
23 countries classified as ‘Flawed’ democracies to create a new grouping of broadly 
democratic emerging and developing countries. While this grouping encompasses a wider 
range of political development scores (6.0-10.0) than the hybrid and authoritarian categories, 
this exercise ensures that the full sample dataset can be tested with respect to political regime. 
The results of estimation of the third set of models, Models 6, 7 and 8, representing the three 
political regime types, are shown in Table 4. Again, splitting the sample countries highlights 
some interesting findings according to regime type. For the democratic group of countries in 
Model 6 (column 1), lagged GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient at the 
one per cent level, again providing support for growth convergence. Domestic investment is 
found to have a positive impact on growth and is significant at the one per cent level while 
inflation has negative effect and is significant at the five per cent level. Of particular interest 
to this study is that the human capital variable has a negative coefficient and is significant at 
the one per cent level while the FDI-human capital interaction term is strongly positive and 
significant at the one per cent level. The political development variable for this group of 
countries is insignificant. 
[Table 4 here] 
For the ‘Hybrid’ democratic countries, the results for the standard growth variables in Model 
7 (column 2) are broadly similar to those in Model 6. Their economic growth however, 
appears to be positively affected by FDI but only when it is present in conjunction with 
political development and/or an educated populace since both interaction terms are positive 
and significant at the one per cent level. Neither political development nor human capital, 
individually, is found to have any significant impact on economic growth. 
The findings for authoritarian countries in Model 8 (column 3) are in strong contrast to those 
for the democratic and hybrid countries. In the authoritarian country case, FDI is found to 
have a strongly positive effect significant at the one per cent level, both on its own as well as 
in conjunction with the presence of human capital. The interaction term between FDI and 
political development however, is negative and significant at the five per cent level, 
suggesting that political development accompanied by FDI inflows lowers growth.  
These results show some support for the positive contribution of democracy to economic 
growth but only for Upper- and Lower-Middle Income countries. This suggest that 
‘deficiencies’ in democracy are primarily concentrated in poorer Low Income countries 
where political development is unlikely to be particularly conducive to strong economic 
performance. 
5. The Growth Effects of FDI& the Role of Income & Political Development: 
Summary & Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of the levels of income and political development in 
determining the growth effects of FDI in 61 emerging and developing countries. The 
empirical analysis uses an augmented baseline panel data model to test a range of growth 
determinants, notably FDI, human capital and political development. The baseline model is 
then extended to incorporate interaction terms between FDI and human capital and FDI and 
political development to examine the joint effects of these variables over and above their 
separate impacts. The model is further augmented to test the separate growth effects of FDI 
on the three lower World Bank income classifications (Upper-Middle, Lower-Middle and 
Low Income) followed by three categories of political regime type derived from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. As such, the paper provides further new 
insights into the nature of the growth effects of FDI across a large sample set of emerging and 
developing countries according to their income and political regime. 
 
The Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries: Income Level Effects 
The impact of FDI on growth in emerging and developing host-countries is found to vary 
according to their income classification. The results suggest that FDI has a positive and 
significant impact only on the least developed (Low Income) countries and that these 
beneficial effects are lessened considerably with higher levels of political development. For 
Lower-Middle income developing countries, FDI alone has a negative effect on their 
economic growth although this dampening effect is, at least, partly ameliorated by improved 
political development. In the case of Upper-Middle income countries, none of the FDI-related 
variables are significant; instead, domestic investment is shown to be a far more important 
driver of their economic growth performance. This appears to reflect the alleviation of 
domestic capital constraints in these economies and a consequent reduced dependence upon 
foreign capital inflows to finance and drive economic growth. Interestingly, the two human 
capital variables have an insignificant impact across all three income groups. This lends 
support to the findings of Nair-Reichert & Weinhold (2000) and Ram & Zhang, 2002) and 
contrary to the threshold absorptive capacity argument, although the latter has been argued to 
be conditional upon institutional and political development. Minimum threshold levels of 
human capital associated with positive FDI growth effects however, are found for all regime 
types. These effects are enhanced by greater political development in the case of Lower-
Middle Income countries but reduced by it in Low Income ones. Overall therefore, the results 
presented here provide mixed evidence for the efficacy of FDI as a driver of economic 
growth in emerging and developing countries, dependent upon both human capital and 
political development. 
In trying to explain the differential growth effects of FDI across countries’ income categories, 
its nature and objectives may be a key factor. Low Income countries are likely to be 
predominantly the recipients of resource-based rather than market- or efficiency-seeking FDI. 
While FDI in natural resources generally involves the use of advanced technologies, their 
transferability to the rest of the host-economy – and therefore the potential for positive 
growth spillover effects – may be very limited. For market- and efficiency seeking FDI, Low 
Income countries represent less attractive market opportunities for foreign investors 
compared with wealthier Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle Income economies because of 
limited consumer purchasing power, lower economic growth expectations as well as, 
possibly, greater institutional constraints reflected in a less attractive trade-off between 
country risk and long-term profitability. 
 
The Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries: Political Development 
Effects 
An increasing number of studies contend that the levels of political development and 
institutional quality in host-countries are important determinants of the growth effects of FDI. 
This study uses the EIU Democracy Index to test this argument with respect to regime type – 
democratic, Hybrid and Authoritarian. Political development has a significantly positive 
impact upon growth generally in both of the baseline models and also for Upper-Middle 
Income countries but not poorer Lower-Middle and Low Income developing countries. 
Empirical analysis of growth effects by regime type suggests that FDI and political 
development have virtually no impact on economic growth, either individually or through 
interaction, for democratic emerging and developing countries. For these countries, it is the 
aggregate effects of the human capital variables that are important. Conversely, for both 
Hybrid and Authoritarian regime, FDI in conjunction with human capital and political 
development are both found to be strongly significant growth factors. Both interaction 
variables create significantly positive growth effects in the Hybrid regimes while only FDI- 
human capital does so in Authoritarian regimes along with FDI-political development having 
a significant growth-reducing effect. These findings lend some considerable support to the 
existence of critical thresholds of education and/or democracy in emerging and developing 
host-countries proposed in the empirical literature rather than FDI simply being a driver of 
growth on its own. By distinguishing between regime types in the empirical analysis, this 
paper generates some subtle conclusions regarding the inter-relationship between the growth 
effects of FDI inflows and political development in that it identifies distinct differences 
between the impact upon democratic, Hybrid and Authoritarian regime types. 
A comprehensive explanation for the differential growth effects of FDI by regime type is 
perhaps beyond this paper but several possible points can be broached. There may be a 
degree of correlation between regime type and income level in the sample countries although 
there is no general and consistent pattern. The growth-suppressing impact of FDI in 
Authoritarian countries could be related to the earlier argument regarding natural resources 
but again, there is no clear causal relationship between authoritarianism, low income and FDI 
in natural resources. There may be a greater deal of institutional fungibility in authoritarian 
countries however, such that some of the growth benefits of FDI are dissipated through 
corruption and/or conflict. More authoritarian regimes tend to favour relatively closed 
economies and dirigiste rather than market-based policies that preserve domestic monopolies, 
effectively ‘crowding-out’ foreign investors. This remains an important topic in both 
international business and political economy that merits further investigation and analysis. 
The situation with respect to Hybrid and more democratic host-countries appears to be more 
clear-cut in that FDI promote growths and enhances long-term prosperity. 
 
Concluding Comments & Policy Implications 
The empirical results generated by this paper tend to confirm many of the arguments of 
previous empirical studies and reinforce their findings. This is certainly the case with respect 
to the well-known benefits derived from greater stocks of human capital which generate 
higher rates of growth and positive spillover effects from FDI because of its greater 
absorptive capacity.  
Perhaps the most notable finding in this paper is the confirmation that, for Lower-Middle 
income developing countries at least, a minimum threshold of human capital is required in 
order to generate growth gains from inflows of FDI.  
A second noteworthy finding is that the growth effects of FDI are not found to be particularly 
important in relatively wealthy developing and emerging economies. The empirical results 
here suggest that these countries have reached the stage in their evolution where they are able 
to generate sufficient funds domestically to finance their investment needs and that this is a 
more critical source of their growth. 
A final important finding – and one that has been the subject of some debate in the literature 
– relates to the growth effects of FDI in authoritarian developing economies. The empirical 
results in this paper suggest quite strongly (at the one per cent level of significance) that 
while FDI promotes growth, higher levels of political development reduce these effects. 
Some of the other results provide important evidence of subtle interactions between the 
critical variables highlighted in this study, namely human capital, income level and political 
development. These require further investigation and will hopefully stimulate additional 
research to ascertain improved understanding regarding the determinants of these effects. 
The primary policy implication of this paper’s findings is that it provides further strong 
support regarding the critical importance of maximising the potential local growth effects of 
FDI in developing countries by improving the absorptive capacity of domestic human capital 
through education and vocational training to facilitate technology spillovers. In the first 
instance, this depends upon there being sufficient investment in good quality education and 
training to reach the critical minimum threshold of human capital but it also requires 
emphasis to be placed upon attracting increasing inflows of efficiency- and market-and 
seeking FDI that are more likely to generate desirable growth-promoting spillover effects. 
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Table 1: Dataset of 61 Emerging & Developing Countries By World Bank Region, 
Income Classification in 1990 & Political Regime Type 
 
World Bank Region Income Group 19901 Income Group 2013 Regime Type2 
 
Africa, Sub-Sahara (22) 
 Botswana Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Burkina Faso Low Low Hybrid 
 Cameroun Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Authoritarian 
 Chad Low Low Authoritarian 
 Congo, Republic Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Authoritarian 
 Gabon Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 The Gambia Low Low Authoritarian 
 Kenya Lower-Middle Low Hybrid 
 Lesotho Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Madagascar Lower-Middle Low Hybrid 
 Mauritania Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Mauritius Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Democratic 
 Mozambique Low Low Hybrid 
 Namibia Lower-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Rwanda Low Low Authoritarian 
 Senegal Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 South Africa Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Sudan Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Authoritarian 
 Swaziland Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Authoritarian 
 Tanzania Low Low Hybrid 
 Togo Low Low Authoritarian 
 Uganda Low Low Hybrid 
 
East Asia & Pacific (5) 
 China Low Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Indonesia Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Malaysia Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Philippines Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Thailand Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed  
 
Europe & Central Asia (9) 
 Armenia Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Belarus Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Bulgaria Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Hungary Upper-Middle3 Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Kazakhstan Upper-Middle3 Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Kyrgyz Republic Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Moldova Upper-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Romania Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Ukraine Upper-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
  
Latin America & Caribbean (14) 
 Argentina Upper-Middle Upper-Middle4 Flawed 
 Brazil Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Colombia Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Costa Rica Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Democratic 
 Dominican Republic Lower-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Ecuador Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Hybrid 
 El Salvador Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Guatemala Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Honduras Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Mexico Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Panama Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Paraguay Lower-Middle5 Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Peru Lower-Middle Upper-Middle Flawed 
 Venezuela Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Hybrid 
 
Middle East & North Africa (7) 
 Algeria Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Egypt Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Authoritarian 
 Iran Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Jordan Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Authoritarian 
 Morocco Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
 Tunisia Lower-Middle Upper-Middle Hybrid 
 Turkey Upper-Middle Upper-Middle Hybrid 
 
South Asia (4) 
 Bangladesh  Low Low Hybrid 
 India Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Flawed 
 Pakistan Lower-Middle Lower Middle Hybrid 
 Sri Lanka Lower-Middle Lower-Middle Hybrid 
  
 
Notes: 1, GNI per capita @PPP, $US, 1990, based on 2011 ICP Round data. 
 2, EIU Democracy Index classification. 
 3, data for 1993. 
 4, No data available, classification is non-controversial. 
 5. Data for 1995. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
 1. GDP per capita Growth (% annual) 1452 0.02 0.05 -0.64 0.31 
2. Lagged GDP per capita (logarithm) 1453 7.34 1.,01 4.96 9.37 
3. Domestic Investment (% share of GDP) 1459 0.25 0.15 0.00 2.62 
4. Labour Force (% growth as share of total 
population) 
1403 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.07 
5. Government Expenditure (share of GDP) 1467 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.41 
6. Inflation (% annual) 1515 0.46 2.90 -0.26 62.61 
7. Secondary School Enrolment (%) 1400 0.60 0.27 0.05 1.10 
8. FDI (% share of GDP) 1494 2.92 105.51 -0.16 4076.01 
9. Political Development Score (points) 1525 5.31 1.65 1.50 8.17 
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 Table 3: Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries: All Countries & 
Income Classification 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 








Lagged GDP per capita -0.0817*** -0.0833*** -0.0751*** -0.1158*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0178) (0.0271) 
Domestic Investment  0.0364*** 0.0323*** 0.1500*** 0.0153 -0.1213 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0284) (0.0107) (0.0755) 
Labour Force Growth -0.1497* -0.1494* -0.01172 -0.3573* 0.8481 
 (0.0893) (0.0894) (0.0924) (0.1894) (0.5997) 
Government Expenditure -0.2785*** -0.2755*** -0.2379*** -0.2618*** -0.1570 
 (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0678) (0.0593) (0.0999) 
Inflation -0.0039*** -0.0043*** -0.0109*** -0.0016 -0.0016 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0308) 
Secondary School Enrolment -0.0343* -0.0318* 0.0096 -0.0538 -0.0662 
 (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0228) (0.0337) (0.0559) 
Lagged FDI -0.0026* -0.0507 -0.0836 -0.1876** 0.8553*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0554) (0.0843) (0.0932) (0.2836) 
Political Development Score 0.0396*** 0.0399*** 0.0441*** -0.0044 0.0047 
 (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.0317) 
Lagged FDI * Secondary School 
Enrolment 
… -0.0599 -0.0740 0.0044 0.7008 
  (0.0561) (0.0854) (0.0612) (0.5309) 
Lagged FDI * Political 
Development Score 
… 0.0010 -0.0047 0.0309*** -0.2184*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0119) (0.0571) 
Intercept 0.5265*** 0.5372*** 0.3992*** 0.9428*** 0.3050* 
 (0.0776) (0.0778) (0.0803) (0.1260) (0.1796) 
R-squared 0.3879 0.3899 0.5197 0.4152 0.4530 
Number of countries 61 61 28 22 11 
Root Mean Square error 0.0361 0.0361 0.0310 0.0378 0.0372 
Number of observations 1213 1213 561 455 197 
Wald Chi Square (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 1, Standard errors in parentheses and * p <0.10, ** p <0.05 and *** p <0.001.  








Table 4: Growth Effects of FDI in Emerging & Developing Countries: Political Regime 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate  
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Democracies Hybrid 
Democracies 
Authoritarian 
Lagged GDP per capita -0.1339*** -0.1081*** -0.0536*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0145) 
Domestic Investment  0.1413*** 0.0156 -0.0279 
 (0.0304) (0.0119) (0.0489) 
Labour Force Growth -0.0333 -0.5694*** 0.0943 
 (0.1169) (0.1696) (0.1764) 
Government Expenditure -0.0537 -0.3218*** -0.3441*** 
 (0.0676) (0.0696) (0.0941) 
Inflation -0.0084** -0.0013 -0.0090*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0019) 
Secondary School Enrolment -0.0830*** -0.0108 0.0349 
 (0.0237) (0.0336) (0.0439) 
Lagged FDI -0.3370 -0.1296 0.7801*** 
 (0.5479) (0.0887) (0.2987) 
Political Development Score 0.0009 -0.0727 -0.0027 
 (0.0771) (0.0804) (0.1066) 
Lagged FDI * Secondary School 
Enrolment 
0.2323*** 0.0907*** 0.3182*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0305) (0.0708) 
Lagged FDI * Political 
Development Score 
0.0475 0.0328*** -0.2555** 
 (0.0830) (0.0116) (0.1078) 
Intercept -0.4185** 0.4916*** -0.7749*** 
 (0.1775) (0.0932) (0.1939) 
R-squared 0.4096 0.4530 0.5626 
Number of countries 25 20 16 
Root Mean Square error 0.0320 0.0363 0.0366 
Number of observations 534 384 295 
Wald Chi Square (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 1, Standard errors in parentheses and * p <0.10, ** p <0.05 and *** p <0.001.  
2, All estimations control for control for country- and time-specific effects.  
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